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THE REMEDIAL RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS
AGAINST THEIR DIRECTORS.
It is the purpose of this article to consider, briefly, a topic
which has occasioned much discussion in the courts, during the
last ten or fifteen years; namely, What redress is open to a corpora-
tion dissatisfied with a contract entered into with it by a direc-
tor; and what are the principles which underlie such remedies?
We will first suppose a case. A director in a corporation buys
certain property, as a mine, a patent right, or a piece of land, pay-
ing therefor five thousand dollars. Very soon afterward he disposes
of it to the corporation for ten thousand dollars, taking its obliga-
tion for said sum; when that obligation matures, the corporation
having passed under a new management does not wish to honor
the obligation. What may it do? What it might like to do would
be to insist that the contract was utterly void, on the ground that a
director is absolutely incompetent to deal with his corporation in
any matter in which he is personally interested; that therefore the
courts should deny him any relief, thus enabling it to retain the
fruits of the contract, and, at the same time, avoid payment. May
it do this? We think not. Doubtless there are expressions in
many decisions which would seem to justify this, as in Port v. Rus-
sel, 36 Ind. 6o; Pickett v. School District No. r, 25 Wisconsin
55 r. But the only American case in which such doctrine appears
to have been expressly held, as the ground of decision rendered, is
that of People v. Township Board, ii Michigan 222, where cer-
tain persons, authorized to let contracts for the township, them-
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selves bid for, obtained and performed the contract. Being refused
payment for services rendered, they appealed to the courts, which
refused them assistance. This is manifestly a somewhat extreme
case, and the decision, so far as we are aware, has not been fol-
lowed. Ordinarily such a decision would be highly unjust and
inequitable, and the conduct on the part of a director to warrant
it must be grossly improper. So it has generally been held that
the acceptance of the benefit of the transaction imposes an obliga-
tion to assume its burdens, and that therefore, while it would be
the undoubted right of the corporation seasonably to rescind such
a contract, and tender back the property, a right which would
exist in all cases of contracts by a director with a corporation in
which he acted as a member of the board, in a matter in which his
interest was adverse to that of the company, thus treating the
contract as one voidable at its election, yet, if nothing was done
in avoidance, the contract would stand. Barr v. N. Y., L. E. &
W. R. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 175; Mall6ry v. Mallory Wheeler Co.,
6i Conn. 135; Tryon v. White & Corbin Co., 62 Conn. 171.
But now suppose the corporation does not desire to rescind,
because the contract is beneficial to it as it stands. Though orig-
inally bought for five thousand dollars, and sold by its purchaser
to the corporation for ten thousand dollars, the property has
proved to be worth very much more than even the larger sum.
Has the corporation, notwithstanding this, a cause of action against
its director? Doubtless it may have under certain circumstances.
There are two principles, either of which will support such action,
provided the facts warrant the application. The first, which may
be called the equitable rule, is this: In all cases where a person is
directly or constructively an agent or trustee for other persons,
all profits coming into his hands from the business in which he
is so employed, belong in equity to his employer, and not to him-
self. The right of a principal or cestui que trust to undisclosed
profits, is wholly independent of the right to rescind the contract,
and, in all probability, has its chief value in cases either where the
contract cannot be rescinded, and the parties restored to their
former situation in reference to the subject matter, or where rescis-
sion is not desired by such principal or cestui que trust. He.does
not desire the contract to be varied. He demands, as an incident
of equity and fair dealing attaching to such contract, that his agent
or trustee shall hand over any profit clandestinely made by him.
Making a vendor return something he ought not to have does not
affect the contract. Hence, by affirming it, no right is released
not inconsistent with the contract itself. Now, although directors,
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or managing agents of corporations are not trustees in a technical
sense, since, unlike those strictly so, they do not hold the legal title
to all or any of the property of the corporation, they are often spoken
of as trustees, because the relation is in many respects, one of the
highest trust and confidence. They are invested with the most
extensive powers, and the exercise of such powers demands the
utmost good faith to the company, in all transactions. It follows,
then, if the director concealed the fact of his own ownership of
the property, throwing the corporation off its guard, because
inducing the supposition that he was acting, as he was bound to
act, in its sole behalf, not endeavoring to perform the impossibil-
ity of faithfully serving two masters, himself one, whose interests
are in conflict; or, if the property was so desirable for the use of
the company that it is fair to be inferred that it was purchased by
the director with a view of making a profit on the sale to the
corporation, at a time when, if he had acted with an eye singly to
their interests, he would have bought it for them directly; then
equity, which "considers that as done, which ought to have been
done," will regard the original purchase as having been made for
the corporation, though the title was taken in the name of the
director, and will hold the amount agreed to be paid by the cor-
poration in excess of the sum paid by the director for the property,
as damages which may be recouped from the contract price.
Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., L.R., 5 Ch. Div. 73;
R. R. Co. v. Kelley, 77 Ill. 426; McGourkey v. Tol. & Ohio R. R.
Co., 146 U. S. 536.
The other principle which the corporation may invoke may
be called the legal one. It is the same, or at least so obviously
and completely analogous, as to be justly treated as the same,
which exists in that class of cases, well known to the law, where
a vendor has been guilty of fraud. The purchaser may, if he
chooses, confirm the contract, and, nevertheless, sue the vendor
for fraud. Cooley on Torts, 589, 591. Thus, if, after discovering
a shortage in goods, the price is paid, an action lies for the fraud,
although the contract may not be disaffirmed. Nauriian v. Oberle,
90 Mo. 666. Where a partner sold his own goods to a partner-
ship, without the knowledge of his associates, he was held liable to
account to them for the profits. Bentley v. Craven, 18 Beav. 75.
An interesting case of this character is that of Murray v. Jennings,
42 Conn. 9. It was an action for fraud in the exchange of a
horse by the defendant for a yoke of oxen, the defendant fraudu-
lently representing the horse as sound, when it was not so. The
plaintiff was guilty of no fraud, and would not have made the
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
exchange but for the defendant's representations. It was an even
exchange, the oxen at the time, were found by the court to be
worth $roo, the horse was worth $125, and if sound would have
been worth $225. The plaintiff who was a woman retained the
horse, and claimed to recover this hundred dollars. The defen-
dant's counsel, in his brief, said, "Here is fraud, but no damage.
Instead of loss, the plaintiff made $25 by the barter." If the
plaintiff had returned the horse, she could recover but $ioo. Can
she keep it and recover the same? The court said that she could.
If, therefore, in the case supposed, the director used any art
or artifice, calculated to deceive and defraud, an action by the
corporation, affirming the contract, might be sustained on this
ground.
Closely akin, in its legal aspects to the position of a director
or managing agent of a corporation, is that of a promoter. This
word has been said to be "not a legal, but a business term, usefully
summing up, in a single word, a number of business operations,
familiar to the commercial world, by which a company is generally
brought into existence." Bowen, J., in Whalley Bridge Calico
Printing Co. v. Green etal., 28 Wt'y Rep. (Q. B. Div. i88o) 35r,
352. In reference to such persons, James, L. J., in New Som-
brero Phosphate Co. v. Erlanger,' L. R., 5 Ch. Div. ii8, said:
"It is quite open to a man to buy any property he likes, at any
price he likes, with a view, or in the hope, of selling that property
to any company that he can get to buy it, if that is the mode in
which he intends to dispose of it. A man may buy at a.ny price,
and may sell at any price that he can fairly get for it. But that
has nothing whatever, as it appears to me, to do with the question
in this case, which is, whether a man who has so bought, at a low
price, has obtained a higher price, fairly and properly, in accord-
ance with the view which a court of equity takes of such transac-
tions. A promoter is, according to my view of the case, in a
fiduciary relation to the company which he promotes, or causes to
come into existence. If that promoter has a property which he
desires to sell to the company, it is quite open to him to do so,
but upon him, as upon any other person in a fiduciary relation, it
is incumbent to make full and fair disclosure of his interest and
position with respect to that property. I can see no difference in
that respect, between a promoter and a trustee, steward or agent."
The law upon the important subject of the rights and liabili-
ties of promoters has probably, up to date, received more consid-
eration in the English courts than in this country, although such
cases are getting somewhat frequent in our American reports.
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Mainly, a high standard of integrity and fairness is recognized,
and sought to be enforced. In addition to cases already cited,
which illustrate the doctrines of this article, chiefly as applied to
promoters of corporate enterprises, a few others may be added.
Ladywell Mining Co. v. Brooks, L. R., 3 4 Ch. Div., and on appeal,
same case, 35 Ch. Div. 400; In re Cape Breton Land Co., L. R.,
29 Ch. Div. 795; Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. Div. 385; Hichins v.
Congreve, i Russ & My. i5o; McElhenny's Appeal, 6i Pa. St. i88;
Simons v. Vulcan Oil Co, 6i Pa. St. 202; So. Joplin Land Co. v.
Case, 104 Mo. 572; Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Hartmont, L. R., 5
Ch. Div. 394: Mission L. & W. Co. v. Flash (Cal.), 32 Pac. Rep. 6oo,
and the very late, and still unreported, Connecticut case of Yale
Gas Stove Co. v. Jedediah Wilcox et ux.
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